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by John Hansen
Four alternatives to trial by jury for serious fraud trials have been presented in a Home 
Office consultation paper. John Hansen outlines the advantages and disadvantages of 
these suggestions.
The upsurge of business and economic globalisation and the bewildering speed of recent advances in technology have made business, and the litigation associated with it, 
much more complex as we approach the millennium. An 
offshoot of this has been that fraud trials have became more 
complex and inevitably have taken longer. In virtually every 
jurisdiction, where such cases have been heard by juries, 
concerns have been expressed at the sheer length of the trials, 
their complexity and the ability of juries to cope adequately with 
the issues that have arisen. Every jury jurisdiction has struggled 
with how to deal with these problems.
In the UK the suggested responses to these difficulties can be 
found in the Home Office consultation paper Juries In Serious 
Fraud Trials. The paper puts forward four separate options as 
alternatives to the present form of jury trial. Retention of the 
status quo does not appear to be an option.
These options are suggested ways of trying those fraud cases 
that are described in the paper as 'serious fraud trials'. The 
paper discusses ways of identifying serious fraud trials and it is 
clear the term will encompass all cases transferred under s. 4 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1987 and any other cases where a 
preparatory hearing has been ordered under s. 7 of the same 
Act. The decision as to whether or not a case should be treated 
as serious fraud will ultimately be for the trial judge, based on 
the overriding criterion of the 'interests of justice'. The judge 
will also be required to take into account the following factors:
(1) whether the case requires some specialised knowledge;
(2) whether the factual issues are complex or voluminous;
(3) whether prolonged examination of documents or accounts 
would be involved;
(4) whether the trial, as a whole, would be unduly long or
complex.
There is intended to be an interlocutory right of appeal 
against the decision that a case is to be heard by the alternative 
method. Following that, the mode of trial will be specifically 
excluded from the possible grounds of appeal against any 
subsequent verdict.
SPECIAL JURY
The first of the four options is that the trial be heard in front 
of a special jury. Special juries are not new; in the past they were 
the same size as a common jury but the jurors had the status of 
'banker, merchant or esquire'. What is now suggested is a more 
sophisticated screening process. The paper mentions possible 
disadvantages, chief of which will be the elitist nature of this 
special jury. That was one of the reasons for abandoning special 
juries previously. A further serious disadvantage will be whether 
sufficient jurors will be available. In my own experience in New
Zealand, there appear to be few professionally qualified persons 
on juries. Those that are selected are often retired or from 
professions that would give them no particular skills in relation 
to serious fraud matters. Whatever the reason, professionals 
seem to be more able than most to avoid jury service.
JUDGE SITTING ALONE
The second option is for a judge sitting alone. The paper 
actually uses the term 'experienced judge' but does not 
elaborate. It is unclear whether this envisages the somewhat 
invidious process of selecting certain criminal judges to hear 
serious fraud trials. If this is envisaged, it carries its own 
particular set of problems, not least of which is who selects the 
judges. It would seem unlikely that such a course would find 
favour with the defence bar. There is also an option of a panel of 
judges, but this would appear to be something quite radical in a 
common law jurisdiction. There are also difficulties with 
majority decisions and, in most jurisdictions, there are already 
too few judges to go round.
Mention is made of the right in New Zealand for the 
defendant to elect for trial by judge alone. This is provided for 
in s. 36IB and 361C of the Crimes Act 1961. It is not limited to 
fraud cases, but it is available for all offences where the 
maximum penalty7 is less than 14 years' imprisonment. The 
largest and most significant fraud trial in New Zealand was 
conducted before a judge alone at the request of the numerous 
defendants. It involved copious documents and electronic data. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the trial was dramatically 
shortened by being heard by judge alone. The decision was
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handed down expeditiously and the ultimate appeals, that went 
as far as the Privy Council, were unsuccessful.
The authors of the discussion paper are concerned that the 
option remains with the defendant, but at least that would 
answer what will be obvious concerns from the defence bar. 
What the New Zealand experience does show is that, even in the 
most serious and complicated fraud trials, defendants will elect 
this option. It is certainly worth considering.
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FRAUD TRIAL TRIBUNAL
The third option contemplates the creation of a fraud trial 
tribunal. This would consist of a judge and suitably qualified lay 
members. Reference is made to the Financial Services Tribunal 
as a guide to how such a tribunal would function. However that
body, while considering fraud and other serious matters in the 
context of individuals faced with disqualification from 
employment in the financial services industry, is not 
determining criminal guilt. Judges sitting with experts are not 
uncommon in the civil jurisdictions of common law courts, but 
in criminal jurisdiction it is quite a radical step.
JUDGE WITH JURY LATER
It is the fourth option discussed that is perhaps the most 
unusual and marks the most radical departure from our 
accepted concepts of criminal law and the respective functions 
of judge and jury. This is described as trial by a single judge with 
a jury for key decisions. It is envisaged that the trial would have 
three broad stages. The first would consist of the judge 
identifying the issues. The authors consider this would shorten 
the process, because it would prevent the need for pre-trial 
evidential rulings, as the second stage would consist of the judge 
making determinations of fact. At this second stage the judge 
would deal with the factual issues; the authors equate this to the 
present summing-up, but it is obviously far more than this. 
The judge would make findings of fact but would not determine 
guilt. The final stage would consist of the jury being sworn in 
and the judge then explaining the case to them. The jury would 
then be asked to determine whether the conduct amounted to 
dishonesty or whether inferences could be drawn that a 
defendant had requisite knowledge or had behaved recklessly.
The extreme difficulties of this unusual approach are 
highlighted in the paper which acknowledges that the judge's 
finding on the factual issues may need to be supplemented by 
evidence from the defendants explaining themselves, or even 
additional evidence from key witnesses! It would appear likely
that this alternative will be the least likely to receive support.
In the New Law Journal, 20 February 1998, Robert Rhodes QC 
deplored the suggestion of doing away with jury trials for serious 
fraud. His article contains trenchant criticisms of the proposals 
in the Home Office consultation paper. However, serious fraud 
trials do create problems of length and size and it is proper that 
those difficulties be debated. It is to be hoped though, that such 
a fundamental change as denying the right to jury trial would 
only come about from reasoned debate with full regard to the 
rights of defendants. It would be wrong if it came about because 
of certain well-publicised, unsuccessful prosecutions.
There is the added danger that it could be the thin end of the 
wedge. Very complicated evidence can arise in other areas as 
well. In New Zealand there was a highly publicised attempted 
murder trial. It was an allegation of poisoning against a jilted 
lover. Both parties were academics and the victim enjoyed a 
worldwide reputation in his field. The poison allegedly used was 
extremely rare. Experts from around the world gave evidence 
for prosecution and defence. The nature of their evidence was 
extremely complex, probably more so than that given in most 
complex fraud trials. Should cases such as this have some special 
procedure? Why should a special procedure apply only to fraud 
cases with complex evidence and not to other criminal charges 
with equally complex evidence? These are critical questions that 
need to be examined with very great care before something as 
fundamental as the right to trial by jury is lost. ©
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The best way forward in fraud 
trials?
by Christopher W Dickson
Much could be done to improve existing jury trials, believes 
Christopher Dickson, who looks at the background to the 
consultation document on the future of juries in serious fraud trials, 
and discusses the possible outcome.
The recent Home Office consultation document on the future of juries in serious fraud trials has been characterised by some as an attempt to ensure that the 
high profile Serious Fraud Office defeats of the past are not 
repeated in the future. I do not believe that this is its purpose. 
Contrary to popular perception the Serious Fraud Office's 
record is a good one: most recently a 94.4% conviction rate
since April 1997, with a 'lifetime' rate of over 70%. It is a record 
which stands comparison with those of comparable prosecutors 
anywhere, reflecting as it does some of the most difficult and 
complex criminal cases ever tried. I do not believe it would have 
been significantly different, taken over the last ten years, 
whatever alternative mode of trial had been in operation.
What is really behind the Home Office document is a desire
